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Liability for Tra.nsboundary Environmental Damäge 
Towards a General Liability Regime? 
Thomas Gehring • and Markus Jachtenfuchs „ 
Sincc 1980, the lnla'Dational LawCommision (ILC) has beeil cogqed in drafting ac:omprdiensivc 
convention on liability for damage aruing out of acts not probibited by international law. During 
its wort. tbe ILC has i.ncreasingly focased on transbouDdary environmemal damage. Tbua, the 
projectmay have considerable impact on the furtbcr deve1opmeD1 of tbis area of international law. 
This article analyzes the basic concepm of the project wbich have emerged so f'ar. lt asseues 
tbe political feasiöility of tbe project in the lightof tbe c:urrent stateof intem.ational law conceming 
liability for environmental damage, given that a number of specific ultra-hazardoua activities are 
already regulated by mu!tilatenlJ liability regimes. lt concludcs that tbe international community 
has increasingly acceptcd tbe obligation to regulate liability issues. which hu improved the 
cbances for victims to mount suc:cessful claima. However, tbis does not mcan that states were 
prepared to compensate for transboundmy cnvironmental damage. 
L The Spedfic Cbaracter ot International lJabllfty for Envtronmental Damage 
1be fundamental legal eoncept guiding relatiom between states is the sovereignty of states. 
According to this principle, states are not restticted in tbe use of nabU'al resoun:es within tbc.ir 
renitoiy as long aa they do not inU:rfere wirb tbe interests of otbec states enjoying rhe same rigllt. 
Hence, tbe principle of state sovereignty implies both the rigbt of an independent exploitation of 
existing natural resourca and the right to inviolability of the national territory. I Tberefore, if an 
activity gives rise to tran.sboundary environmental damage or risb of such damage, tbe riglm of 
tbe concemed stata arising out of the same inremational legal nonn are at stake. 
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Liability for Transboundary Environmcntal Damage 
In order to solve tbis conflict, several concepts have been developed in international law .2 All 
of tbem encounter serious difficulties when applied ro specific cases. Frcquently, t:bey are not 
appropriate for tbe resolution of disputes. Consequently, transboundary environmental damage 
is rarely repaired. Even in these casescompensation is not made on the basis of lhc rulcs of geucral 
international law, but i.nstead finds its legal foundations in conventions stipuJating deWled and 
tberefore applicable legal tules for specific risb. In ocher cascs compensation is paid u gratia. 
i.e. without acknowledging an obligation to repair. In practice. responsibility furan intemationally 
wrongful act will be refused because it will be held that the dam.age bad not becn significant, and 
tha1 rules for fault or sttict liability are not yet regarded as sufficiently precise at thc international 
lcvel. 'Ibis leads international legal scholars ro occasionally distinguish between tbc 'validity' of 
a norm of international law and iu :cffcctivcness' .3 Howcver, legal norms will only be apt to 
influencc political decisions if thcir lllthoritativencss is accepted by dccision-makers. that is. if 
they are effective. A furtberproblem relates to the extent to which states can be bcld responsiblc 
für damage rcsulting from activities of private partics. According to traditional international law, 
states are nonnaily notdin:ctly rcsponsiblc für such activities unlcss it is cstablished tbat they were 
obliged to control dangerous activitics witbin the scopc of tbeir sove:reign control, and that they 
failed to do so.4 
With continuing in.dustria.lizaon and increasing risks of transboundary environmcntal 
damage, tbere is a growing nced to establish specific rulcs that are precisc enougb tobe applicable 
and that a.re thcrcforc apt tobe 'effectivc'. However, a derivation ofthese specific rulcs in tbearea 
of transboundary environmental damagc from the general law of state respon11öility involves a 
number of fundament.al problrms. According to tbe traditional concept of intrm.ational law, tbe 
notions of 'respmw"bility' and 'fault' are closely interrelated. Tbe cstablishmcnt of lhc breach of 
a primary nonn of inlmlational law by tbe source state is tbe prc-condition for thc right of tbe 
affected state tobe compensated for thc damage suffcred.!5 H such a breach can be established, 
the source stale will be obliged to repair the whok damage. Hit cannot be cstablisbed. it will not 
be liablc to repair any pan of iL 
However, highly complcx industrial activities crcate riJb which can be minimi:r.ed but not 
complctely eliminated. Tbeconcept of stateresponsibility does not forcsee any duty tocompemate 
fordamageduc to activitics whicb are notprohibited by international law. Furthennore, acc:ording 
to traditional international law, establi.shed legal wrongfulness of an activity baving cau.sed 
transboundary harm entai1s thc obligation to ~ iU operation. Thc source stale cannot avoid this 
comequence even if it ia preparcd to rcpair the damage which bas occurrcd.6 In many ~ 
2 Lc. a genaal oblipdon of due cflliaence or the condldoa of signiflcance of damage. sec R. Pisillo-
Mam:sdri, 'Dw Dfliiatce' ~ raponsabllltd brurnalJonah degli Stall (1989); id.. 'Fonm of 
Imemarional Raponsibility for Environmental Hann', In P. Prmicioni n aL (ed.). Inrrmation.a.I 
Rap>mibility for Enviromnemal Harm (1991) 1.5-2.5. 
3 See A. Verdroa. B. Simma, Unlventllu V61Urredu (3rd cd. 1984) S2-S3. 
4 See Klrnminicti, 'VOlkemchtliche Hiftmlg fUr du Handeln Privater Im Bereich des imrmaEiomJen 
Umwdlschutzes', 22 Archiv du V6lhrr«hu ( 1984) 243-248. 
S 'Primlry rulc:s' establish tbe distinction between l.awfl1l and unlawful ICdvities. 1beir violation cntaila 
lepl c:omequenca whlcb are lpCCified in 'sccoadary rulea'. See Simml. 'Grundfrqal der Staa1a1-
veranrwortlicbkdt in der AJbdt der International Law Cmnmiuion', 24 Am\/11 da V61Urrttlia 
(1986) 362; soe also Quemin-Baxter, la Report. Ybll.C (1980) paru. ~2.5. Until 1987, tbe Reports 
of the lpeCial rapportems of tbe n.c will bc quoced refening to the Yearboob of lhe InrenlllioDal Law 
Commiaion (VoL II. Pan 1respcdive!y).From1988"oowarda, 1efcaeuca will bc madc to die UN 
Dncumcnt syinbol 
6 See Mlgraw, 'Trambnnndny Haml: Tbe ~onll Law Commission's Study of "Intrmational 
Lia,bility'". 80AJIL ( 1986) 318. For acomrary view aee Boyle, 'Stare Rcspomiöi.lity and IntanationaJ 
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however, states bavc a strong intercstin premoting certain activities and inaccording themastallls 
of lawfulness, altlro11gh these activities may entail transbomidlry risb. Thetefore, such riab 
cannotbesuftic:iendyregulatedeveobyadetailedcodific:ationoftbelawofstateresponsibility.7 
On tbe contrary, esW>liahing too close a link between flult and tbe obligation to compensate for 
damage frequaitly does not resuh in an intemalionally accepted ban of a particular dange:rous 
activity, but radler in a refusal by tbe soun:e state to c:ompensate; since any acceptance of the duty 
to n:pair damage would imply aclalowledgement of a violation of international law and thus 
endangei- the funue operation of tbe activity in question. 
n. 1be Project of tbe Internatfonal Law Commfsdon 
'Ibis dilemma, whic:h cannot sati.sfactorily be solved within the traditional system of international 
law, laid tbe foundationB for tbe International Law Commission • s project on tbe codification aod 
progressive devclopmcnt of the rules of intemaJ:ional liability for damage caused by activitics not 
prohibiUIJby international law.9 
A. Balandn& Interests 
Tbe basic aim of Robert Quentin-Baxter, thc fust special rapponeur on tbc topic, was to retain as 
much freedom u possil>Jc for swes to exploit tbeir resourccs, and at the same time to strengtben 
1he rigbts of possibly affected (neigbbouring) states.10 His concept was based on the expectation 
tbat states would acceptrisk aeating activities in other states more easily if a mutually acceptable 
preventive and compcnsatory legal regi.me could be agreed upon. Tberefore, tbe transfet of the 
existing principle of balancing interests to tbe area of transboundary eovironmental risks below 
the level of an undispllJell breacb of a rule of international law 11 sbou1d be in tbe general interest 
of botb 1he source aod tbe affected state, since it provides both sides with an opportunity for an 
activc fonnation of mutual rclations. 
1be theoretical queation of tbe lawfulneu of an activity is necessarily rendered less important 
once a state on whose taritory and under whose control a risk creating activity is canied out 
reacbes a mutual agreemem witb affected (neighbouring) states upon tbe rigbts and obligations 
in connection with that activity and thc risks involved. Agreement bad to include tbe duties of 
pmienlion prior to and compensation afur possible funue damage. In tbis c:ase, obligations of 
prevcntion and liability for potential damage could be scpara1ed from an invcstigation of tbe 
lawfulness of tbe bann creating activity and its opcration, 12 since the rights and obligations of the 
states involved were based on agn:ement, i.e. exclusively on primary rulcs of international law. 
1be nccesaity of fint establisbing a breacb of a rule of international law would tbus be avoided. 
'Ibis approac:h removed the empbasis of the project away from identifying a clear dividing linc 
Uabiliry for Injurious Couequenca of Ac11 not Prohiblu:d by In1emational Law: A Necessary 
Dlstinctionr. 39 ICLQ (1990> 1i.14. 
7 See Quentia-Baxter, 2nd Report. YbILC (1981) para. 51. 
8 See YbR.C (VoL 1) (1970) 233, para. 83. 
9 Forlbe close rullionshipoflbeILC project withotbcrattempts todevelop intrmational enviromncnCBI 
law sec Quentlll-Baxla', Ist Report. Ybll.C (1980) pana.. 4-8. 1be projed'• lollg-winded title 
('lntenwionall.ilbilityforlnjurioulComequencesArisinsoutofAasnotProlu'blledbybna'natioaal 
, Law') indicata lbe initial conceptual c:oalmloa c:onccming tbe subsumtive c:oatent of lbe IDpic. 
10 See Qucntin-Baxrer, Ist Report. Ybll.C (1980) paru. 26-31. 
11 BcyODd dlls dneshold, 1he ru!el Of siate respomi'bility apply; see Quentin-Baxter, 2nd Report. 'YbD..C 
(1981) para. 10. 
12 See lbid.. paras. 84-86. 
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between the two projects of thc n.c on international respomiDility for wrongful acts and 
international liability for consequences of acta not prolnöited by international law. Instead it 
focusedonsolvingthepractical problemof assuring compensation fortbevictimsof 1ransboundary 
enviromncntal damage.13 
In addition. it must be empbasized that a clear distinction betwCen source and affecttd states 
is only mesningful for a limited number of instanc:es of transboundary en\lironmentaJ damagc. In 
many cases. the conflicting parties are faced with a more complex mutual relationship because 
they pursue similar activities and are lhus at the :same time causing ri&ks. injaries and suffering. 
'Ibis is particularly true for activities: they cause risb and injuries and are at the sanu time victim.s 
of similar risks and injuries. For insmnce, most European states operate nueleär power stations 
and thus create riaks, bowever small, ·of transboundary nuclear contamination. At the same time, 
all of tbem are suffaing similar risks of potential fu~ damage created clsewhcre. Here, tbe 
solution of transboundary environmcntal problcms can.not be limited to an improvcment of 
mcdtarrisms for compcnsarion. Instead, comprchcnsive regimes accommodaring tbe interests of 
all stau:s c:oncemedarc nceded. This requires co-operation with thc aim of solving partial conflicts 
within an ovcrall balancc of intr:rests. From this point of vicw, codificarion of international law 
in the ficld of liability for environmental damage is only onc clcment within a ~neral rcgulation 
which also comprises thc clements of prevcnrion and minimizarion of damagc. 
On the basia oftheac considerations, the first spccial 1apporteur in bis Scbemaric Outline of 
the projcctl4 proposcd a frameworlc convcntion containing p~dural pilklinu for the 
claborarion of detailed rcgimes governing spccific Ca.scs. 'Ibis framewort convention should 
primarily have a catalytic function for the adoption of a multitudc of concrcte bilareral or 
multilataal agrcements. l~ In ordcr to facilitate early ncgotiations bctween the states concerncd. 
this procedure shou1d a1rcady apply to thc planning stagc of a dangerous activity. Tbc Scbcmatic 
Outline tbeief0tecreatcdaclose linlc betwcen thc clements of safety, information and compcnsation 
within a singlc regime ('the continuum of prevention and reparation') 16 and thus cnlarged thc 
scope of thc projcct beyood thc formal mandate givcn to thc n.c. 
In order to avoid thc cxpccted rcsistance of a multitude of states agaimt rigid liability rules, 
Quentin-Baxter's concept dehöcrately did not include any compcnsatory automatism whicb 
would havc amounted to strict liability. The necessary consequence wu a certain "ncgoti.ability' 
of the obligation to repair damagc in cascs where thc states concemcd bad not~ on a specific 
regime befon damagc occurred. 
B. 1be Obllptlon to Repalr 
In 1985, tbe Argentinc diplomat Julio Barboza succecded Qucntin-Baxter in the influcntial 
function of the special rapporteur for the projcct. He had beeil critical of the widening of the scopc 
of the project and of the vague sutus of the obligarion to compcnsate for damage. 
Despite difficulrics inhcrcnt in the integrarion of preveotive and repararive elements in a 
singlc instrument. be ncvertbelcss dec:Jared bis intcntion to basically maintain the now undisputed 
inregraliveapproach.17Wbercasobligarionsof prevemiveaction and ofinformation arc incrwingly 
13 See Dupuy, 'Ressources narurellea panag6es et n:ssources de l'lwmanitE. 54-'6 y~ o/tM 
Assocl4tion of the Alunden and A.lwrr1li of tli6 Hagw Acadlmy a/ lntmtational U:rw (1984-86) 221. 
14 Quentin-Baxrer, 3rd Report, YblLC (1982) parL ,3. 
1' See Quentin-Bamr, 4tb Report. Ybll.C (1983) para. 69. 
16 Ibid.., paras.. 40 seq. 
17 See Barbo:za, 2nd Report. Ybll.C (1986) paru. 6-8. 
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accepced in intrmaliooal law, intrmational liability nJles exilt on a mucb weaker basiJ. Linking 
bodl aspects could tbua unintentionally soften duties of prevention and infomwion.18 ükewise, 
malcing tbc duties of preveotion and reparation compulsory tbreatens IO introduce an implicit 
triggerfortbe regulatioo of transboundary bann by tbctules of state responsil>ility instead of those 
of intemadonal liability.19 lt bas not yet been decided bow tbe two areas will be 1inked. 
For tbe preseni special npporteur, tbe core of the project consistcd initiaßy in shifting tbe 
economic bunien of ttaDSDationa1 cnvironmenml damage to tbe soun:e sta1e whi.cb. afla' all, 
gained profit from its risk creating activities. His carly reports indicated tbat witbin tbe project he 
intendcd IO focus on tbe residual rcgime regulating tbe obligatioos to repair~ Tbe principle 
of strict liability of tbe source state tberefore bad to be tbe starting point of any concCptualiz.ation 
of tbe right of reparation on tbc part of tbe affected state; given tbat in tb.e c:ue of activities not 
probibited by international law tbe element of aubjective or objective fault is Iacting by 
definition.20 Starting from this principle, ncgotiations between states concernedcould be directed 
at a li.mitation of liability in particuJar cues on tbe baais of a balance of interestl. This approach 
meant tbat tbe development of a detailed and geoeral1y applicable regime on liability for 
tran.aboundary environmenral damage bccame tbecenteipieceoftbe project.21 Since tbe intention 
of the project would remain tbe encouragment of swes to concludeagreementsregulatingspecific 
activities witb tranabouodary implications, tbe generaI liability n:gime would fulfil a subaidiary 
function. Activities govcmed by specific regimes wen: tbus only indirectly affccted by tbis shift 
of empbasis. However, Iiability oftbe source state for activities not covmd by specific regimes 
would be considerably reinfocced, altbough it would be to somc degree negotiable.22 
The qaestion remained wbetber a liability regime putting high economic risb upon statu 
would eventual.ly be accepted by these states. In 1990, the spccial rapportcur thaefore proposcd, 
within a comprebensive setof draft articlcs. a new cbapterwbich was intended to reinforc:e private 
remcdics for compensation of traDSboundary environmental ha?Jn.23 However, tbis siep did not 
mitigate the impact of tbe envisaged rigid obligation of swc liability, but simply anempted to 
assure a minimum degrec of uniformity of private remedics.24 Whi.le so far tbe principle of 
liability of tbe soun:e state for tran.llhmmdary environmcntal damage from act:ivitics carried out 
by private partiea bad been considered u beiDg widely acceptable, tbc majority of states 
commenting on tbe project in thc Sixtb Committee DOW favowed placing primary liability on the 
18 See Barboza, 4tb Report, 1988 (Al'CN.41413) pau. 103-lll. Tbe c:onfHct fOCUICS OD the lack of lepl 
c:oasequeacea of a breach of tbe pnerally acknowledpl oblipdoas of ~on llDd informatioo 
accordin.i IO tM ndo uf dtJs pro}«I. 
19 See Hort.:h. "Ibe Coafuslon aboutSClle Respoom'bility llld Inla'D&tional Liability', 4 LeiünJOfU1141 
of /111e1'Jt1Jdmtal Law (1991) 72.. 
20 See O'Kecfc, 'Tl'llllboandary Polluliaa llld tbe SUict lJability 11sue.. 'Ibe Wort. of tbe IDlernational 
Law C.ommillion oa tbe Topic of Intcmllional Uability for Injuriou Comequences Arising Oul of 
Acll Not Probibitcd by lnlmwional Law', 18 Doiwr JOfUPIQ} u/fnW1tJJ/ÜJNI} Lawand Polky (l 9891 
90) 14.S seq. 'Ibis lpprOICb raised some criticlsm, • L Brownlie,Sysran u/IM Lllw o/Nations: Statt 
RupoMbilily, Part I (1983) 49-50; J. WUllJch. Stau Ruponsibllily for TtduiologkaJ Doma,t in 
/1111madoltal Law (1978) 293-296. 
21 See ll.C-Report, 1991(A/4&'10)pll'L236. 
22 See Anl. 9 md 21 of tbe proposed draft Aniclca. Barboza. 6cb Report. 1990 (AICN.41428) 44 aod 48; 
ICe abo Blrboza, 7tb Report, 1991 (AJCN..11437) para. 48. 
23 See BarlJcm, 6tb Report, 1990 (M:N.41428), clnft AnicJea 28-33, and n.c-Repon. 1990 (A/4S/10) 
paru. .S20-.S24. 
24 See Barbo1.a. 6tb Report, 1990 (NCN.41428) para. 62. 
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(private) operator oftbe risk cn:ating or barmfuJ activity. Only residual liability, if any, ahould 
be placed on the autborizing state.25 
The special rappotteur and tbe majority of the Commiasion26 responded positively to this new 
developmcnt Although tbe detailed structure ofthe general regime on environmental liability is 
not yet clearly visJ'ble, it may theaefore be assumed that the focus of the project bas shifted from 
international liability (mitigated by private remedies) to private liability (possibly tobe reinforced 
by some residual liability of the authorizing state). Tbc direction of this important turn of tbe n.c-
project21 is largely in confomüty witb existing convcntional liability regimes or those still under 
preparation. 
llL Environmental LJablHty Regimes In Multilateral Agreements 
In tbe past three decadcs, states bavc concluded a number of conventions containing primary 
liability rules witb respect to some specific risk creating activities, especially in the areas of 
international maritime, nuclear, and space Iaw. In some c:ases, they accepted swe liability. This 
should howevcr not lead to tbe conclusion that states were gmerally prepared tobe held liable for 
transnational environmental damage. On the contrary, an eramination of the conventional 
regimes reveals a more differentiated picture of existing state practice with far-reaching 
consequences for the futun: development of the international law of environmental liability. For 
a realistic analysis of the emergence and later application of liability rules it is indispensable to 
take into account how these rules actually came into being. to explore which groups participaled 
in tbe law maldng process and to identify lheir regulatory inten:sts. Tue following chapter will 
analyze the extent to which it is possible to draw generalizations from tbc most important existing 
conventional liability regimes, witb a view to establishing a general regimc.28 
A. IJabDlty for Marttbne Transport of Oll: A Model for Tra.mmatioaal En'rironmental 
LlabWty Reatmes 
With regard to its ecological. economic, and political goals. tbe regime of liability for damage 
caused by maritime ttansport of oil constitutcs a model for modern environmental liability 
agreements. lts emagence started in 1967, immediately afterthe accident of tbe oil carrier 'Torrey 
Canyon' which bad caused hitberto unprecedent.ed damage in the English CbanneL Tbc accident 
clearly demonstrm:d that risks relating to the transpOrt of oil bad considerably increased with tbe 
opc:ration of super tankers and tbe growth of maritime transport in general. All preventivc 
measures as well u tbe existing liability rules for maritime transport proved tobe insufficient 'Ibe 
British govemment faced important financial claims partly due to costs of clean-up measures and 
panly due to the political necessity to take over the considerable losses whicb bad occ:urred to 
private pel'SODS and territorial authorities.29 lt therefore asked the st.ates represented in the lntcr-
govemmental Maritime Consult.ative Organiz.ation (IMCO) to draw consequences from the 
25 See Barbcm, 7th Report. 1991(A/CN."41437)pa-.21. 
26 See n.c-R.eport. 1991(A/46110)paras.236-243. 
27 See ErichJen, '[)u LiabiJity Projekt der ll.C', '1 äiuchrl/t jfJr OIUlilnt:l1sdw iJffetulü:hu Rechl ll1ld 
V61Urr«lrt (1991) 124-126. 
28 In lbe framew k: of d1il articJe, this can only be done to a limiled extent. For an in-deptb analysis see 
T. Oehring. M. Jechlenfucbs. Hajbmg lind UmwlL lmtruunkmrfliktt im lntemationalm Wtltralan-
• A.tom· """Sureclrz ( 1988). 
29 For tbe actual com see M. M'Oomgle. M. Zacher. Polbltion. Polilia and lmematlonal /Aw. Tankln 
at Sea (1979) 146. 
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accident. Tbe IMCO-Council reacted by proposing a listof24 items forfurtberconsidention.30 
Aside frommeaaura in the field oftechnical safety oftankm, trafticrules, and lherightof coastal 
states to intervene in tbe case of events dangerous forthe environmentocaming on lhe High Seas, 
it proposed. with an exclusively economic objective. to formulate an improved liability regime. 
Legal measurcs wen: intended to sbift the costs of ri.sla of environmental pollution linbd to the 
maritime transport of oil to tbose parties gaining profit from thal activity. 
Tbe states represented witbin IMCO did not consider it necessmy to develop the law of 
intemalional liability, for instance by putting new liability burdena oo tbe ßag state. Further, tbe 
majority of states was not prepmd to jointly shoulder tbe economic risk involve9. in_tbe transport 
of dangerous goods at sea. The representati.ves of Western states in particular stressed that states 
sbould not be held liable for risb created by private industry for its own economic i.ntei'est.31 For 
tbis reason. swes focused on a broadened civil liability. Accontingly, tbe core question became 
bow and to whal extent tbe oil transporting industry could bcar additional liability obligations and 
whether liability should be extended to the oil proc:essing industry, whicb aJao profited from 
maritime transport of oil 
The industry concemed favoured a solution in the framework of cxisting private maritime 
liability law. Contrary to sbipping interests organi7.Cd in tbc Comill ~international, tbe 
oil industcy announc:ed dw it wu ready to cooperate within c:ertain limita. In 1968, major oil 
companies adopted voluntarily a private liability ~32 initially exclusively applicable to 
theirown tanken. but afterayearit already covered more than 90 percentof the world tanbrfleet. 
Tbe voluntary regime facilitated acceptance of tbe concept of a liability channelled toward tbe 
ship owner and limited to an insmablc amount 
A diplomatic conference mecting in 1969,33 which was beld in order to &dopt an international 
coovention incorporating tbe new rules into lhe body of international law, was charactetized by 
tbc conflict of two groups of states divided over tbe issues of tbe type and amount of liability. In 
gcneral, coastal states, being possi'blc victün,, of pollution, opted for strict liability. Tbe states with 
meir own tank.er flcets promoted the principlc of fault liability, however modified by a rcvcrsal 
of the bunten of proof. Tbus. a poJarity of interests emerged which aeems to be typical for 
ncgotiations on the allocation of the economic burden of environmental bann linked to an activity 
thal is itself widely considered bcneficial. Wbereas the majority of participating states wu at IM 
lll1M time depcndent on the maritime transport of oil and, u coastal staies, cxposed to thc 
environmental risks involved in lhe activity, most delcgations nevcrthelcss clearly joined one of 
the two camps. 
In order to avoid a brcakdown of ncgotiations, the modeJ of an exclusive liability of the ship 
owner was supplcmentcd during tbe confcrcnce by tbe cstablishment of an international oil 
pollution compcnsation fund thus providing an additional layer of liability and transferring part 
of the economic burden to the oil processing industry. This made thc initially suong raistance 
against an inttoduction of the principlc of strict liability almost disappear. Accordingly, tbe final 
text of the convcntion34 provides for a limited liability of tbe shipowner witbout proof of fault 
1be sharing of the economic bmden by scveral branches of indusay and thc rather complicated 
30 See 'Conc:luaiom of tbe Council oa die Action to bc Taken oo die Problems Brougbt to Ught by ehe 
Los& Oftbe 1'orrey Canyon"', lnter-govemmcnlal Maritime Cons11ltati'IC Orpniz.ation Doc. CJES.III/ 
5 . . 
31 See 'Oll Pollutioo of tbe Sei'. 9 Harvard lnurnalional Law Joumal ( 1969) 334-335. 
32 Tanker Ownen Volunlaiy Agreemeut Conceming Uability for Oll Pollutioa (berafta' referred ID as 
TOV ALOP) 1968, 8 n.M (1969) 498. 
33 Fora descriplion Oftbe proc;eedlnp Of tbec:onfcreuce see He!bcr, 'Das lnb:rnationale Obereinkommen 
llberdie Haftung fOrSc:hldell durch Ölversc:bmutzml1aufSee'.35/labeJsüllsdtriftftlrmulibulUdw 
llNl illumatlonalu PrlW11ndil (1970) 230 scq. 
34 lnlema!ional ConYaJtion on Ovil Llability forOil Pollution Damage. 1969, 9 ll.M (1970) 4~. 
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cstablishment of an international fund scemed to be more acceptable to sta1eS than a subsidiary 
liability of tbc controlling. i.c. f1ag smte. 
During the drafting process of the fund convention,3S a dUect participation of swes in the 
financing of the fund wu never serioualy considered. By establishing a privately financ:ed 
voluntary compensation scheme36 during the preparatory pbase of the fund, the oil proccssing 
industry demonsa:rated its general agreement with thc cnvisaged secood layer of liability. Tbc 
international fund could tbus be based on the Nies of this private model 
Since the establishment ofthe oil liability regime of I969nt, in no case bave states, even on 
a subsidiary basis. becn prepan:d to take over inter-govemmental liability obligations. This is not 
swprising with regard to activities which are sufficicntly profitable so as not to require a shift of 
cconomic risks of costly env;tonmental damage to the public. Tbc capacity of the insurance 
market bas considerably eniarged during the put two dccades. 'Ibis, combined with the 
avaHability of additional compensation from tbe international fund. should mean that liability for 
oil pollution damage can be coveied by tbe polluting induslJy aJone.37 
The basic principle of this combined regime38 which stipulates a strcngthened liability to be 
bom exclusively by the profit gaining private industry, bas been incorporaied into thc ( draft) nües 
of international rcgulations of liability for damage cn:ated by both maritiJDe39 and inland 
transport40 of dangerous goods and into a c:onvention which regulales oil drilling activities in the 
North Sea area. 41 All thcse regulations aim at an improvement of compensati()D for victims of 
tranSDational environmental pollution. including states. 
8. 1be Nudear Llabfilty Conventlons 
The regulatory goal of international law on liability for nuclear damagc was completely different. 
lt was primarily conceived to relieve the nuclear supply industry of the incalculable risks posed 
by high compensation claims. To achieve this goa1, the nuclear liability conventions 'c:hannel' thc 
duty to compensate exclusively to the operator of a nuclear imtallation. They thus exonerate all 
otber parties involved in the devclopmcnt of nuclear energy from any obligation to compensate 
for nuclear damage. 
3S IntenWional Convention oo tbe Establishment of an International Fand for Compensation for Oil 
Pollution Damage. 1971, 11n.M(1972)284. 
36 Contract R.eprding an Interim Supplement to TankerLiability farOil Pollution (CRISTAL) 1971, 2 
Joumal of Marlrime Law and Commetu (1970f71) 705. 
37 Despice die c:oasidcrably iDc:reased cosu of oil pollution, die degree of coverage is a purely polltical 
clec:ision; see Smeu, 'The Oil Spill Risk: Economic Assessment IDd Compensation Umit', 14 Jo111'11Dl 
of MarilJIM üzw and Cotrvun:e ( 1983) 23 seq. 
38 In 1984, tbe Rgime bas been modified by two protocols; Protoc:ol to die International Convention on 
Civil Uabillty for Oil Pollution Damage. In lnmnalional Environmmral Law, No. 969:88/A and 
Proroco1 rotbellltemational Convenlion oa dleEstablishmemof an ImemllionalFundforCompensation 
forOil Polludon Damqe. ibid.. No. 971:94/A. 
By lbe end of 1991, 47 SC11e1 wa"e pudes to ehe combined regime. Addilioaally, 24 countries bad 
ralified only tbe oll lialrility convention. Beside diese public intenwional law trealies. TOV ALOP and 
CRIST AL. 1be priVllC llability agieements of die oll trampotting and lbe oll processing industries. still 
c:ontlnue to exilt. 
39 Drift Coavention oa Liability and Compemalioa in Comlexion wilb tbe Carriqe of NoxJOUJ and 
Hrwdoas Substm:el by Sea, 1984, 23 n.M (1984) 1.50. 
40 Convemion OD CMJ Uability for Damage Caused During Caniage ofl>angerous Ooodl by Road, RaiJ 
and Inland Navigation Veuels, 1989, United Nations Economic Cnmrnission for Europe Doc. ECFJ 
TRANS/84 (IDcludl.ag aplam1ory report). 
41 Convention onCivil l..iabilityforOilPollution Damlge Resulting fromExploration forandExploiwion 
of Seabed Mineral Resoarces. 1976, 16 n.M ( 1977) 14S 1. 
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In tbe 19SOs. tbe Uaited Staia sappJyindustty, wbosecooperatioo seemed tobe indispemablc 
for tbe peacefu1 use of nuclear energy, was not prepared to take over tbe incalculable economic 
risk involved in tbis new activity •. Tbe developmau of tbe new and promising teclmology 
tbrea1ened tobe~ wzleu the ltate or tbe operatorof the auclcar .installadon wet"C to t&te 
ovcr full liability. At that time insurance companies were certainly not capable of covering tbese 
economic risb.42 In l 9S7, therefore, tbe US legislator feit obliged to channel liability exclusively 
to tbe opentor of a nuclear .inscalladoo and to exonerate all otbec parties c:omplctdy from tbe 
economicrisbofpossiblenucleardamage.Tbestatetookovectbepartoftbeeconomicrukwbicb 
could not be cove:red by priva1e insurance. 
In its carfy years. thc exploitatioo of nuclearcnc:rgy in Western Europe was~ completely 
dependent on the Amcrican supply iDduStry.43 Again, an effective limitation of liability was 
required to avoid a cut of essential supplics. Tbcrefore, the US nuclearenergy legislation44 seived . 
as a mode1 for ncgotiation of an intmwional convention. The negOWions wen: started in 1957 
Wlder tbe auspices of tbc Organiwion for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) and the 
participants included the Unitcd Sta!a supply industry and European insunnce busincss. With 
regard to tbe regulalory goaJs of the future in.strument, thc'e was widc-ranging bomogcneity of 
intercsts. All participatins W cst European starcs conaidered tbemsclves in tbe first place as funue 
producera of nuclcar coergy and were, consequendy, intetesu:d in tbe promotion of the ncw 
teclmology and in tbe gra.nting of ec:onomic privilega to it. 
Tbe 1960 Paris Convent:ion adopzs tbe concept of an excluaive non-fault civil liability of the 
operaior,45 wbich must be coveied by insurance. Tbe contracting swes we.re tberefore bound by 
thc limited capacity of tbe insunmce mutet. 46 Jn ordcr to facilitate tbe development of nuclear 
energy, tbey p:cefened to transfcr tbe lion 's share of tbe costs of a possiöle accident to tb.e victims 
or to their home countries. Subsidiary state liability, as envisaged in US nuclear energy Jaw, was 
bighly controvcrsial during the negotiations. However, a majority of states was not ready to 
accept, in IM lnterut of possibk victilns, proviaioos for subsidiary swe financed compensation. 
lnstead, tbe Paris Convention (Annex ll) refers to the existence of a pomöle additional buis for 
intcr-govemmental claims according to general international law, i.e. to thc rules of state 
responsiöility. Howevcr, given tbeir 1'ck ofprecision. an applicat:ion oftbese rules beats well-
known difficulties. 
The Paris Convention alone did not achieve 1he regulatory goal of overcoming the obstacle 
of incalculable liability wbicb bampered the developmem of nuclear CllerJY. Because of tbe 
42 See Belser, 'Examen des solmioaa appcr'l6ca per les loil natloaalel et les conveotions inlenllliona1cs 
sm la rapomabili~ dlml le domainc de l'&erpe IWC~ aux prob~ par Ja couvenure de 
ccue ~·,in Droil 1U1Cllain auopfttt. CoUoque. u May 1966 (1968) 78. 
43 See Belser, 'Atomic Rists: Tbi.rd Party Liability 811dimmuce', in 1M httblstrlal Cltalknie ofNuclear 
ÜID'fY (Amsttadam Cout'aea:a:) (1938) 278. 
44 Price-Andenon-Amendav:nt of2 Scptemba 195710 tbe Atomic Energy Act; reprinted inJ. Weinsitin 
(ed.), Nlld«u Uabülty(Progras inNoclearf.na]y, Vot 3; SeriesX: Law and Administtalion) ( 1962) 
mseci. . 
4.S Convemionon 1birdPany Liabllity In tbeFicldofNoclear F.nergy.1960, 6üropemt Year6oo.t(l960) 
268. 'lbe rulea of tbe Paris C.OOvemion. originally limited to die Emopean Mcmhe:r Statcs of lbe 
Orpnimicm for EmopelD Economjc Coopemioo (OEEC) (larer tbe OECD), bave been blsically 
incorporared into die 1963 V'aenna Ccnvemion oa Qvil Liability for Nuclear Damage, UNTS, VoL 
1063, No. l· 16197, 263, a global COllValdon ne8QdlU:d in lbe framcwort of lbe lnu:matfoml Atomic 
Energy Aimcy ~ refmcd to as IAEA). 
46 1bis explaißl die extremely low cdlillg of only US SI S million, in exceptiOllll c:ases even merely US 
SS million. providcd by lbe Plril Ccnvemion. 1bcse figura rdlect lbe feYCl'C comcraims of du: 
insurance mmtet, With all cstimatJ::I of a llUClear -=cidellt llllticipltiq far higbl:r coaa. 
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extraordinaiy sevcre limitation of liability of the opcrator, US supplic:rs femd being bcld liable 
by US courts despite tbeir exooeration stipulated in an international instrument. lt was undcr tbe 
pressure of US suppJiers47 that the West Em:opea.n staies in 1963 agreed. in the Brussels 
Supplementary Convention, 48 on the introduction of two IDOft: layers of compensarion. Afta 
privately flnanced funds available UJ1der the Paria Convention are e:rb•nsted, thc licensing state 
of a nuc1ear illSUIDation causing bann assumcs a limited subsidiary liability in tbe second layer. 
Tbe third layer, an insurance-likc pool, is jointly fi.nanced by all contracting states. 
'Ibe regulatory goal of tbe convcntion on tbe liability of operators of nuclear sbips49 again 
facilitated the commercial usc of nuclear encrgy. In its basic fc:atures, it fol,!.ows the rules of 
nucbr, and not maritime, law. Howeva-, aloog with future lic=sing stares, coa.ual states 
potentially affected by an acc:idcnt tdok part in the global negotiations. Tbey retained the rigbt to 
approve- orto proluöit-the entrance of nuclear powered vessels into mcircoastal waten in each 
· individual case. A generally acceptable liability regime was expected to facilitate the ttavel of 
diese ships. Given this c:onstcllation of interests, tbe principle of a limited subsidiary Stile liability 
beyond tbe low amount covered by insured private liability was less controvenial. Nevcitbeless, 
tbe coastal. states bad to accept a limitation of funds available below the level of the combined 
Paris/Brussels regime.50 
Tberefore. the devclopment of an independent body of rules for international nuclear liability 
was ~ for primarily by industrialized sta1e1 wbo sougbt to promote the development of 
nuclear enei-gy. Less pressure tban may have been cxpected was excned by siatea threatened by 
serious nuclear transboundary harm. Contrary to the oil liability regime, the reguiatory goal of 
nuclear liability was not the widcoing but the limitation of liability, with respect to both the 
amount and tbe persons liable. Tbe private liability of the operator is supplementM by the 
international liability. howeve:r biddcn, of the licensing state, and despite tbe fact tbat the cn:ation 
of a direc:t claims procedurc against that state has been c:arefully avoided.51 Stares did not accept 
this liability for the bmefit of potential victims52 but in order to promote a new teclmology. 
47 See Anmgio-Ruii., 'Some I.ntemationa:t Legal Problems of tbe Civil Uae of Nuclear &ergy', lff7 RdC 
(1962-DI) 599. 
48 Conventioa of 31 January 1963 Supplemenrary to lbe Paris Convention of29 July 1960 on lbird Party 
Uability in tbe Field ofNuclear Ener&Y. 2 ll.M (1963) 685. 
49 Conventioa oo tbe lJlhüity of Operatora ofNuclear Ships. 1962. 57 AJIL ( 1963) 268. See Kam. 'Tbe 
1962 Bnwels Convention oa tbe Uability of die Opentan ofNuclear Ships', S1 AJIL (1963) 105 aeq. 
50 'Ibe convmtion never entmd imD fon:e because of a coaflic:t Oll tbe inclulioo of IWC!ear WIJ'lbipl. IU 
liability ~gime boweverwaa inchldedalmost ide:ntically innumerous bilm:ra1 agreemaus.1ee Breuer, 
'Rdlectiom oolntenllliollalAgteemaits Covaingtbe Tnldingof tbe "Oao Hahn" ill Foreign Warers', 
Symposilan on Nlldnr SliJpi (1971) 390 seq. ,1 See A. Hocbe, Das V~rltllltnis der ZM/Jtt;ftlllra~ fiJr Atom- lllld ÖMncltmMrzlmgS· 
ldtlJdm auviJIJ:erm:lrtlJJ:JrmH'1ftwrl (1988) 80-89. Nt:"<a1belea.1tat.es emerimosubsidi.vy liabillty 
in dlCir capacity as controlJbsg ltlllU, i.e. ill an eu:rcise of dlCir ICM\ftignty. 
52 Only afb=I' tbe Olemobyl KCidem, an expert aroup of IAEA Slll1ed fonnulatinB proposala for an 
additional lntemaiicmaJ llability of liceming ltates, with lnconclmive raulls IO far; see Pelzer, '1bc 
ImJ*l of lbe Olemobyl Accident oo Imematioml NucJear &ergy l.aw', 25 Arddvdu V~ 
(1987)308andPolili, 'ln1eru11imJaJIDdCivillJabiliryforNuclarI>lmqe.SomeRt:centDcvdopmentl 
of Smte Pnctice'. in La rlparalitm du tlommatu catamopltüpw. Lu risqllu udtn.olo1iqwu 
ma}an m droil tnurnational et or droit ~- Tr&Vllllt des XIIka Joum6c:s d'~ 
juridiques Jean Dahin 01J11D1*s par 1e D6pai tmnentdc droit intemaiiOllll Cmta De VllSCher ( 1990) 
333-334. 
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C. 1be Space LlabOlty CGOveadoa 
The Space Uability ConventionSJ ia frequently cired in support of tbe hypotbesis tba1 swes were 
almtdy prepared to accept liabiliry for transboundaly environmemal bann in speci.fic aras.S4 In 
fact. tbe convention stipulates a mecbani&m for n:paration along tbc lines of trlditional interna-
tional law. Reparation of damage takes place exclusively among starea; insurancc companies, 
persom privale)y liable, IDd domestic courts u weil u priv&Je victims remain outside the regime. 
Howevcr, tbe ecooomic aspect of compemation was not a major issue during tbe fonnulation of 
the convention. 
lnst.ead. the bi&h militacy and strategic importaDc:e of OUtm" spacedetennined thc Course of tht 
negotialiona. In tbc bcginning of the 1 %0s, botb supeipowers fearcd a militariwion of oater 
space whicb. forvarioua reasons, was not in tbeirinterests..5.5 In the first place political agreements 
were needcd to both provide a secme legal framcwork for space operations and ro avoid an azms 
race in ourerspace. Given these political and milirary problems, oqotiations on question.s relating 
to tbc use of tbis area were beid in a political forum. tbc United Nations Commiuee forthc Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space. and not in i 'tec:hnical' one, aa bad becn thc casc for tbe nuclear and oil 
liability rqimes.56 
In a climate cbaracterized by mutual distrust between thc superpowers, but of basically 
identical interests, thc Out.er Space Treaty57 wu coacluded u a framework agreement in 1966. 
lt obliges states to supervise andcoatrol all space activities starting from theirtenitory andrenders 
them liable for damage resulting from these activities. 'Ibis provision was strongly influenced by 
a dispute ou die genemI admiSll"bility of private space activities • .58 
Since 1962 tbe Space Uability Convention bas been negotiued simultaneously witb the Outer 
Space Trealy. lt cannot tbetefore be comidered an indepcndc:n~ environmental liability regime. 
lnstead, it ia a detailed elaboration of tbc liability provision of a bighly political general 
framewort. 'Ibis explains wby conflicts on economic aspec:ts ofliability have becn of seconduy 
importance.59 1be space industry submitted numerous proposals in attempling to acbieve a 
liability regime modelled along tbe lincs of tbe nuclear liability treaties, witbout however 
achieving more lhan marginal impact on tbe negotialion process. Even tbe United Stares from thc 
outset proposed an exclusive liability of the controlling state without private participation. In 
order not to endanger political agreement, tbe two superpowers, at that time the only states witb 
teclmical capabilities forspacc missions, finally accepted even the principle of unlimired liability • 
.53 Conventioa OD IDlrmltianal Uabllity for DlmqeCIJllCd by $p:e Objeas, 1972, 10 n.M ( l '171) 96.5 • 
.54 See Handl. 'SWe Lilbility for Acddermil Trwzwioaa1 Envlroamental Damage by Privare Penons', 
74 AJ/L (1980) .529; w a1lo ~Doberius. 'Ulbllity for HIJ1Dful Comcquenc:es of lnstances of 
TnmfroDticr PollmioD Noc ProbibilM by IDlli'lD&tioaal Law', 38 (J~ Uluchrift flJr 
IJjfarzJldia RM:lrl ll7ld V/Jll.nndu (1987188) 108 . 
.5.5 F« lhe politlcal c:oaiat of die trelty md 111 n:ladomhip 10 lhe politics of clilll'mament af lhe 
superpowen Re R. Wolfmm, Ok~~"' Raw (1984) 27~278 • 
.56 Tbe role ol lhe UN in die prucea leading 1D lhe space regime ia malyzed in C. Chrisaol, T1ltl Modem 
lrrtenta1ioaal Law of Ollttr Space (2nd ed. 1984) 12 scq. 
.57 Traly ofl.eplPriDc:iplesGovauinglhe AdivitiesofSwes In lhe Explarmion md Use ofOuterSpace, 
1967, 6n.M (1967) 386. 
.58 Tbe iea developedcoumries in panicallrinsiaed OD ID anlimlled Uability fordamqccauscd by spece 
objec:tl 11 tbey wca1d not be able lD UDdertate diese acdvities for a comidmble cimc, see Qiriaol, 
'ID1mDllional ~ for I>amap Camed by Space Objecll'. 74 AJ1L (1980) 3$ 1. 
.59 Suict liahillty for damage Oll esnh MI nlher mx:ontm"Crlial es a proof of fault wmed almost 
impouible. sec Pfeifrer, 'lnlemltional Liabilityfor Damqe Omsed by Spiee Objeca', 30 üllsdirift 
ftlr Uift· llNl WelmnonrrcJrt (1981) 221. 
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'lbc rule of unlimitcd international liability, as enviaaged in lhe Space Uability Convcotion. 
is, therefore. esaentially not tbc result of economic or eovironmental concern but of a global 
political 81T8Dgement. Tbc regulatory interest of tbe conuacting srares consisted only partly in 
shifting tbc economic burden of damage arising from a space casualty to the state conttolling tbe 
activity. The participating states pos5t$sing tbc capabilities for space activities appeied to be 
more interested in the political resu.lt of a regulation as such, than in tbc details of lhe liability 
regime. 
IV. Private l.JabDity and lntemadonal Regulatory Obllgatiom 
The degree to wbich states were in the past prepared to accept liability obligarions was detmnined 
by the regulatory goals of tbe respective regimea. 1be type of detailed in#rnational liabillty 
envisaged in the Space Liabillty Convention corresponds to a specific political constcllation 
which is not typical for the regulation of transnational environmental damage. lt can bardly be 
considered a troe precedent for a general environmental liability regime. In the conteXt of tbe 
different nuclear liabillty regimes. the distribution of economicconsequences of pote:ntiaJ damage 
were of oveiwhelming importance, whereas environmental consideratioos played only a minor 
rote. The reguJatory goal was tbe facilitation of a risk creating infant industry througb limitalion 
of its liability. Only for tba1 purpose did states accept tbe obligarion of a subsidiary state financed 
liability. Therefore, lhis type of combined liability regime does not provide a true precedeot for 
a general regulation of liability for transboundary environmental damage.60 
In contrast, tbe liability regimc foroil pollution damage could serve u a model forfuture Nies 
on liabillty fortranSboundary environmental damage. Its regulalory goal was the improvmrmr of 
the victims' situation. andregimes similarto this type are presently Wider discussion, or bave been 
adopted. for a series of comparable risks. 61 Tbc relative success of this model relies on its specific 
sharing of burden between private operaton of dangcrous or barmful activities and statcs 
autborizing and conttolling lhese activities. 
States have long since acknowledged the necessity to improve cxisting liability Nies and 
accepted an obligation to regulate the issue, but they bave not been prepeud to contribute 
finaocially to the compcnsation of transboundary environmcntal damage. 62 Y et the situation of 
private victims and affected states regarding compcnsation was. or will be. considerably 
improved. 
60 See also Doeker, GehriD&, 'Privare or Intemational Uabiliry fotTl'lllSIWional EnvironmmtalDamage 
-Tbe Pn!cedent o( Cooventioml Liabiliry Regimes'. 2 JOflTl'IOl of Environmental IAw (1990) 15 seq. 
61 E.g. c:onccrniDg sea and Inland ttlDlpOrt of dangeroaa goods as weil 11 for oil pollution from seabed 
drilliDg; sec illltrumenb mentioned in noa:s 69-71. Sec also dJc CounciJ of Emupe Drift CouventioO 
oaCivilIJlbillryforDamapRaullingfromAmviliesDangerous IDlbef.mironmeot, 21 ~
Pollcy ond IJJw (1991) 270. 
62 1bis II to a 1mJC extent also true for tbe liability rula in dJc field of deep-IClbed minin& sec UN 
Convemion on lhc Law of ehe Sea. 1982. 21 n.M (1982) 1261, Art. 139 and Annex m. Art. 4(4) and 
Art. 22. A similar distributi.on between respomibility of supervising 11WCs and private llahiliry of 
conltlCtorl is envislpl in die Drift Regulations oa Prospeedng. Explonr:ion and Exploitarion of 
Polymetalic:Nodules in lhcArea. Cll.lpta'Vtn (Prolectlon andPreservar.ioa ofdleMarine Environment 
from Unacc:epcable OJanges Resulting from Adivltles in dJc Area) LOSIPCNJSCN.3/WP.&A.dd.5/ 
Rev.l, reprinted in R. P1al1.&ler (ed.). TM Law D/ die Sea: 1983-1991 [S«ond ~riu}. Prepuatmy 
Commission for die Intmll1ional Seabed Authoriry IDd tbe hllemaJional Tribuoal of die Law of die 
Sea. Vol. xm (1992) 93. praent)y under disamkm in tbe p1ep11110iy c:ommiaicm ofdle UN seabed 
autbority. See also 1he proviliollll liabllity regime (Art. 8) of die Convmtion Oll ehe Replalion of 
Antatctic Mincrab 1988, rr n.M (1988) 868. 
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Wbat are the c:onsequences of this legal development for state respomibility or international 
liability fortransnational enviromncntal damage?Tbe aDeged distinclion belwcen niles of private 
liability and those of international rtspODSl'bility i.a certainly not u clt:ar-cut u is assumed by 
many authors. In fact. 'private' conveational regimes strongly intcrfere with e:x.isting obligations 
of the controlling state reprding reparation of damage. 63 Tbe interrelatiombip bctween private 
and international rnecl>anilDlS for compensation of jivcn damage is most visfbly illustrmd by 
international nuclear liability law. Under the regimes of the Brussels Supplemcntary Convention 
and the Nuclcar Ship Convention, licensing states accepted relatively high liability obligations 
compared to privately financed funds. Within the frameworlt of convcntional ~-claims are 
settled according to an establisbed procedure by domeatic ccurts witbout proof of fault and 
primarily out of public fimds. Due to the relative simplicity of this proc:edure, claims will be made 
and compens1tion paid in tbe first place on the basis of the liability conventions, even though a 
breach of international law by the comrolling state migbt be provable (e.g. in c:asea of insufficient 
supervision). As long u intemational conflicts on liability i&sues c:an be solved in a satisjactory 
manner by using simplified conventional proc:edures. states will not insist on buing dJeir claima 
on the comparatively vague rules of state responsibility. To be sure. tbe reuon for this is the 
existence of an applicable, detailed md agreed upon procedwe to seule claims. lt is not tbe public 
natin of compeiisation funds. Wbat may beusumed in thec:aseoftransboundaty nuclearclamage 
govemcd by mrud regimes will also be true for incidents governed by exclusively privately 
financed liability regimes.64 
1bis is not to argue tbat a reasonable settlement of compenution claims for transboundary 
enviroDJDCDtal barm is best dealt with exclusivcly under private law. On the c:omrary, tbey shouid 
be govemed by inte:mational law .~ foronly statescan setintemationallyrecopizednorms wbich 
are sufficiently uniform and autboritativc and wbicb can. accordingly, be expected tobe genmlly 
observed. Convcntional liability regimes provide a medium layer between purely private claims 
for compensation of victims of tnn11boundary enviroomental bann on tbe basis of domestic law 
and reparation madc from state to state on tbe basia of ttaditional international law. Individual 
claims for, and transfen of, compensation are formally and financially a matterof privare law, but 
tbey are govemed by conventional regimes tbat are part of international law and bavc even led 
to tbe creation of an inter-govcm.mcntal organizalion, namely tbe oll pollution compensation 
fund. 'Ibis type ofintemational regulation of compensation fortbeconsequencea of transboundary 
envirorunental damage constillnes a categOry of international law which does not fit in with the 
traditional dichotomy of tbe legal onfer. 66 -
Accordingly, the conventional liability regimes, wbether they comprise obligations of tbe 
licensing states to contnöute to compensation of damage or not. overlap with tbe traditional 
63 From a fonnal perspective, tbese effects may be of a 'memy pracdcal' DllUle, see Hocbe, nqJra noce 
5 l, at 232-233. 'lbus, Doebr. Oebring,mpranoce60, didootdispuietbedoclrinalexistenceof a furtber 
bais for reparation of tram"cJnndmy c:nvironmemal damaae. 11 Tomaadllt auu:mes but ill relevm::e 
for lllte c:onduct. Sec Tomuachat, 'lnlanlliOllll Uability for lnjarious ConsequeDces Arisina OUl of 
Acta not Proiuöited by lntanltlonal Law: Tbe Wort of lbe Intenwiooal Law Commiuion', in F. 
Frmcioai et aL (ed.), .aqm.a noce 2, at 51-54. . 
64 Tbe proc:edure of senlement of compailldon c1aima followiq lbe ICCidem lt tbe Sandoz chemica.I 
plant emplwita die delire a! IClla 1D solve dispwa Oll liability irmea beJow die leve1 o( inter-
govemmemal relationa, see Jeau:nm d'Oliveim. 'Tbe Sandoz Blazc: 1be .Damqe llld die Public IDd 
Private Lilbllitlea', In F. Frm:ioni n aL (ed.), lll(llTI DOiie 2. at 429-44$. 
~ See Lana. 'Haftung und Venmt'W'CXtlicht im ~ Umwdtlc:bulz', /111 HlllNlllitarls. 
Futsdrrf/tf/lr Al/twl Ventnm (1980) 523. 
66 See Rat, 'Respomibiliry 8Dd Ulbility for Tranlboundlry Air Pollution I>amaae'. iD c. Flimaman 61 
aL (eda), TrtDUboimdary Air Polbldon. hrumatlonaJ Liga} Aspee1S of Co-opttraliDtt D/ Slalu (1986) 
319. 
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concept of swc responaibility. SuclJ ovcrlapping is unavoidable because different criteri.a apply 
to tbe two conc:epts. 67 lt even bec:ame one of the aims of the projected genmI rulea on liability 
for tnmsnational eovironmental damage present)y um= discussion in the International Law 
Commission. as it provides a meam to side-step tbe de facto inapplicable traditional concept of 
state responn'bility.68 An autboritative international regime which shifts liability obligations 
effi:ctively onto the respective private operaton dot.S not only economically exol!Cl'l!e tbe swe 
community at .!arge from compensatory claims. lt also has direct implications on the development 
of applicab/4 norms on ata1e responmlJility or inter-govemmental liability. 1be bettet 'civil' 
liability agreements iR adaplCd to specific risb of transboundary bann, tbe less urgent is the 
drafting and refining of genenl provisions of state rcspons1öility and inteniiu:ional liability up to 
the point at which they become applicablc.69 
Thcrefore. a trend toward an inaeasi.Dg recognition of tbe obligation to n8Jl}ale transnational 
liability issues by the statt: community as a wbole can be obsaved. However, it does not extend 
to tbe acceptauce of additional iDU::rnational liabilbyobligations by these statea. Tbi& intemational 
legal developmem is iD conformity with the tranmational namre of incidcols of transboundary 
environmentaJ damage. After all. many dangerous or hannful activities are operated by private 
panies, aod a lazge share of tnmsboundaey environmcntal damage is suffemt by private actors. 
The ttansnational nature of the reJationship between victims and operarors of activities 
creating tnm.sboundary risks ar bann 70 suggesu the 'privatization' ofliability obligatiom, Le. to 
placethese obligations primarily upon private operators. 71 Howeve:r, Ibis would ootenti.rely solve 
tbe problem of cases iD which opentors are not identifiable. or wbere tbey 1ack thc necessary 
funds. In tbese cues, it might be desirable to aeate a subsidiuy liability of tbe fu:ensing state as 
part of a combiDcd iegime. but tbe developmcots of tbe past fcw decades do notsuggesttbatstates, 
even on the basis of !Ubsidiarity, would be prcpared to ac:cept such additional international 
liability. 72 Howew:r, both from a transnational and from an environmental perspectivc thc matter 
is mainly one of secured availability of sufficient fund& to compensate tramboundary damage. 
Subsidiaty liability of the licensing state is not the only way to oven:omc Ibis problem, as is 
~ by tbe incmwional oil pollution compensation fund. 73 
67 1bis also clarifies tbe only seemingly panidoxical ddinitioo of tbe scope of lhc topic by tbe fint special 
rapporu:ur Quentin-Baxter. "Ibe wordl ,ICtJ DO( pl'Ohibiled' in tbc title meant 8Cll wbetber probfäiled 
or oot'; ll.C-Y earboo1c 1982, Vol. I. '227. 
68 'Wbeoever poaible. tbe IOpic provides means of avoidin,J Stare to SWe c:onfrontaiiooa'; Quenti.n-
Baxra, 4dJ Report. Ybll.C (1983) para. 43; see also Bmboza. 4dJ R.epon. 1988 (AJCN.41413} pam. 
13-14. 
69 Tbc halian deleple commeuring in tbe Sixtb Commitlee oftbc UN General Auc:mbly oo tbe ILC's 
projectonlrua'nalional Uability observed dW tbe fact thatcompematioo fordamagccould beobalined 
within tbe ftlmewortc of private law 'did not diminale legally die possibility of claims llDder 
intemalional law. allltof'Bh it di.d make die pracrical needfor nlCli clabru ~ly' AIC.6142JSR.4.S, 
para. .58 (empbasil addcd). 
70 Wbere swes opeme such activitles aod wbcre tbey suffer such damagc. lbey do so primariJy in die 
place of private penom. and less in tbeir ClpllCity u subjccts of inlernatiooal law. 
71 As recognized by tbe D..C; see ll.C-Repon. 1991(A/46110)para.239. 
72 Even lhc regula1my C'll!bnsjegm provoted by tbe Cbrmobyl disuter did not lead IO a revenal of dzil 
treDd. Compare tbe optimism of Hand1. • Apta Tchrmobyl: QueJques rdflexjons sur le prognumm: 
~gisladf muhilllbaI l l'ordre do jour', 92 RGDIP (1988) 5.5 IDd 62. widl tbe desaiptloa of lhc ec:tual 
evems by Politi., SMpra notc .52. at 333-334. 
73 Proposab made in tbe fruoewod: of tbe Basel Coavendoa on tbe Comrol ot tbe T.rmsboundlry 
Movemeats of Hazardous Wata IDd tbdr I>Uposal 1989, 28 ~ (1989} 6.57, amceming a liability 
.rqime foau on rwo al!anatives ro .secme tbe aecmaJ')' fuDds. .nameJy sumidiary siate liabiliry or 1n 
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Thomas Gebring and Markus Jachtenfuchs 
V. Concluslon 
Duringthe past three years. tbe ll.C projecl OD liability for(environmenlal) damage from activities 
not probibited by inremationa1 law bu been subjec:t to a fundamental change. The Cnmmlssion 
acknowledged that modern industrial activities leading to tnmsboundary environmental risks and 
harm are frequently c:ani.ed out by private operaun. Primary liability for such damage should 
therefore fall upon tbesc private puties. In conttast. the primary responsibility of states lies in tbe 
areas of prevention of bann, supenision of dangerous activities and, last but not least, provisioo 
of liability regimes guara.nteeing adcquate compensalion of damage suffCRd by victims. 
Coosequently, tbe international iegulation of private liability becomes one of tbe Diost important 
aspectS of tbe law maldng project of thc n..c. A crucial problcm to be solved is assuring that 
nec:essary funds for compenution are in fact available. 1bis may be dooe in various ways; only 
one of tbcm i.s re1ated to tbe inlroduction of a subsidiary liability of licenaing swes. 
Tbc integration of civil and swe liability elements in a c:omprehensive regime, as is intended 
by the Commission. may tutn out to bec:omc tbe most thomy subject of tbe project. 1be 
Commission cannot neglect thc issuc of acc:eptability of SDCh a coocept for the swe community. 
In tbepast. states bave accepcedinrcr-govcmmcntal liabilityoolywmemaordinarycirrmnstances 
whicb cannot easily be transferred to SblDdard situations of trmsbouDdary environmental bann. 
There is no indication tbat dria rductance of states bas fnndementally chanpd and that rhey are 
now ready to accept a convention imposing on them a general intanational liability for 
tramnational environmental damage. 
The Commission shou1d dms take into account tbe continuing process of separalion between 
regulatory obligations on the part of tbe state community and actual liability obligations on tbe 
part of private operators of risk c:reating activities. lt is 81B1Jed here that a convention whicb is not 
limlted to easily identifiable specific risb should theiefore remain below tbe level of a full-
fledged state liability. In its attempt IO integrale private and lltate liabilities., tbe Commission 
shou1d attach priority to the concept of ba)aru:ing of interests. lt would a1ready llDOUllt to a 
profound transformation of tbe international law of liability for enviroomc:nta.l bann if the n.c 
succeeded in codifying a widely accepted international instrument that promotes lhe incrcasing 
accepunce of regulatory obligations by stares. 'Ibis effect would dramatically broa1Jen the scope 
of liability regimes that are privately financed but internationally governed and controlled. 
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intrmmicnal fund; see die prepaiaray d()Cll1'Ml!tl UNEPICHW/WG.l/Zß, IDd UNEPJCHW/WG.l/ 
3 of ID expert aroup atablisbed for !hat purpose. 
